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PHILADELPHIA PARKING AUTHORITY, and VINCE FENERTY, in his official 
capacity as the Executive Director of the Philadelphia Parking Authority, and TAXICAB 
AND LIMOUSINE DIVIDION of the PHILADELPHIA PARKING AUTHORITY, and, 
JIM NEY, in his official capacity as the Director of the Taxicab and Limousine Division 
of the Philadelphia Parking Authority, 
           Appellants 
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District Of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No. 2-11-cv-04692) 
District Judge: Honorable Magistrate Judge Lynne A. Sitarski 
_____________ 
 
Argued Nov. 3, 2015 
______________ 
 
BEFORE: McKEE, Chief Judge, JORDAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
(Filed:  December 8, 2015) 
 
Michael P. Meehan, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Casey A. Coyle, Esq. 
Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott 
Two South 16th Street, 22nd Floor 
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Dennis G. Weldon, Jr., Esq. 
Bryan L. Heulitt, Jr., Esq. 
The Philadelphia Parking Authority 
701 Market Street, Suite 5400 
Philadelphia, PA 19106 
 
  Counsel for Appellant 
 
Stephen F. Gold [ARGUED] 
1709 Benjamin Franklin Parkway, 2nd Floor 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
Julie Foster 
Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia 
1709 Benjamin Franklin Parkway 
United Way Building, 2nd Floor 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
  Counsel for Appellees 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 Appellants Philadelphia Parking Authority, Vince Fenerty, and Jim Ney appeal the 
district court’s order granting in part, and denying in part, appellees Filomena Ward, 
Michelle McCandless, German Parodi, David Wittie, Randy Alexander, Carol Marfisi, 
and Disabled in Action’s Motion for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees. We will affirm the 
district court’s order in its entirety.  
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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I. 
 Because we write for the parties who are already familiar with the facts and 
procedural history, we set forth only those facts necessary to our conclusion. The Parking 
Authority appeals the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees, arguing that it is exempt 
from the fee shifting provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and 
Rehabilitation Act and, accordingly, cannot be held liable for attorneys’ fees under those 
statutes. The Authority further argues that even if those fee shifting provisions apply, the 
plaintiffs are not prevailing parties and are therefore not entitled to attorneys’ fees. 
Finally, the Authority contends that even if attorneys’ fees may otherwise be appropriate, 
there are special circumstances here that render an award of fees unjust. The Parking 
Authority does not contest the size of the fee award.  
 The district court’s January 20, 2015, order granting, in part, the plaintiffs’ Motion 
for Attorneys’ Fees constitutes a final order. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over the 
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The issue of attorneys’ fees presents a purely legal 
question, and therefore our review is de novo.1 We do not disturb the district court’s 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.2 
II. 
A. 
                                              
1 See Truesdell v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 290 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2002). 
2 See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1182-83 (3d Cir. 1990). 
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Parties are ordinarily responsible for their own attorneys’ fees.3 Thus, there is “a 
general practice of not awarding fees to a prevailing party absent explicit statutory 
authority.”4 Congress has, however, unambiguously authorized the award of attorneys’ 
fees to a “prevailing party” in any action commenced under certain statutes including the 
ADA5 and the Rehabilitation Act.6  
 To obtain an award of attorneys’ fees under the ADA, a plaintiff must show she 
has “prevailed.” The Supreme Court has given “generous formulation” to the term 
“prevailing party” to reduce the financial burden on those seeking to vindicate important 
public interests that might otherwise be without an advocate.7 Therefore, “plaintiffs may 
be considered ‘prevailing parties’ for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any 
significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in 
bringing suit.”8 In Texas State Teachers Association v. Garland Independent School 
District, the Supreme Court defined this standard as follows: “[T]o be considered a 
prevailing party . . . the plaintiff must be able to point to a resolution of the dispute which 
changes the legal relationship between itself and the defendant. . . . The touchstone of the 
                                              
3 See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). 
4 Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 819 (1994). 
5 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (“In any action or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to 
this chapter, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other 
than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and 
costs, and the United States shall be liable for the foregoing the same as a private 
individual.”). 
6 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b) (“In any action or proceeding to enforce or charge a violation of a 
provision of this subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, 
other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”).  
7 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 
8 Id. (internal quotations omitted); see Truesdell v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 290 F.3d 159, 163 
(3d Cir. 2002).  
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prevailing party inquiry must be the material alteration of the legal relationship of the 
parties . . . .”9 The Court has further determined that, to be considered prevailing, a 
plaintiff “must obtain [either] an enforceable judgment against the defendant from whom 
fees are sought, or comparable relief through a consent decree or settlement, . . . [and] 
[w]hatever relief the plaintiff secures must directly benefit him at the time of the 
judgment or settlement.”10 
The Supreme Court has clarified that “[a]lthough a consent decree does not always 
include an admission of liability by the defendant, it nonetheless is a court-ordered 
‘chang[e] [in] the legal relationship between [the plaintiff] and the defendant.’”11 Thus, 
where there is a consent decree, “[t]he fact that respondent prevailed through a settlement 
rather than through litigation does not weaken [the respondent’s] claim to fees.”12 Court-
ordered consent decrees, therefore, can give rise to the necessary material alteration in the 
legal relationship of the parties.13  
 Here, as the district court held, the plaintiffs prevailed. The Consent Decree 
provided them with a significant portion of the relief they sought through their complaint. 
Under the Consent Decree, the Parking Authority must issue all 150 medallions provided 
for by Act 119 to wheelchair accessible vehicles. Prior to the Decree, the Parking 
                                              
9 489 U.S. 782, 792-93 (1989) (emphasis added). 
10 Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111 (1992) (internal citations omitted); see Truesdell, 
290 F.3d at 163-64. 
11 Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 
U.S. 598, 604 (2001) (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Garland, 
489 U.S. at 792).  
12 Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980).  
13 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604; Truesdell, 290 F.3d at 164. 
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Authority was only required to issue fifteen of those medallions to wheelchair accessible 
vehicles. Based on the Consent Decree, the Parking Authority has already sold more than 
15 of the 150 medallions to wheelchair accessible vehicles.14 
 The Consent Decree also requires the Parking Authority to post wheelchair 
accessible taxicab notices at the Philadelphia International Airport and 30th Street train 
station as well as advertise the service on its website. Wheelchair users can now request 
wheelchair accessible taxicabs from a dedicated dispatcher. Finally, the Parking 
Authority agreed to help further a policy whereby wheelchair accessible taxicabs are 
moved to the front of the cab-stand line to serve patrons using a wheelchair. 
 This relief provides the plaintiffs with much of the principal benefit they sought 
through their lawsuit: an increase in the number of wheelchair accessible taxicabs. 
Although the plaintiffs have not received all of their requested relief, the Supreme 
Court,15 as well as our own,16 has stated that complete satisfaction is not a prerequisite to 
an award of attorneys’ fees. Even where a plaintiff “asked for a bundle and got a 
pittance,” that “pittance is enough to render him a prevailing party.”17 The plaintiffs here 
have secured much more than a pittance for the disabled community of Philadelphia.  
                                              
14 WAV Medallion Sale Winning Bids, PHILA. PARKING AUTH., available at 
www.philapark.org/taxis-limos. 
15 Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 120 (1992). 
16 Institutionalized Juveniles v. Sec’y of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 912 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(plaintiffs can be prevailing parties “even though the relief they obtained is not identical 
to the relief they specifically demanded, as long as the relief obtained is of the same 
general type”). 
17 Farrar, 506 U.S. at 120. 
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 This Consent Decree also materially altered the legal relationship of the parties. 
Court-ordered and judicially enforceable, the Consent Decree goes much further than Act 
119. Furthermore, this material alteration—improved mobility for wheelchair bound-
citizens—is exactly the type Congress sought to promote through the ADA and 
Rehabilitation Act.18 The ADA seeks to provide individuals with disabilities “equality of 
opportunity, full participation, [and] independent living.”19 By increasing the number of 
wheelchair accessible taxicabs in Philadelphia as well as the ease with which they can be 
called, the plaintiffs meaningfully improved the disabled community’s freedom of 
movement and independence.  
B.  
  The fee shifting provisions of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act apply to this matter 
even though the district court never reached the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims under 
these statutes. The Parking Authority contends that it does not owe attorneys’ fees 
because it is not liable under the statutes giving rise to such fees, i.e., the ADA and 
Rehabilitation Act. To support its contention of non-liability under these statutes, the 
Parking Authority relies on the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Noel v. New York City 
Taxi and Limousine Commission.20 In Noel, the Second Circuit held that the New York 
                                              
18 See Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93 
(1989) (“The touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry must be the material alteration of 
the legal relationship of the parties in a manner which Congress sought to promote in the 
fee statute.”). 
19 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (7). 
20 687 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2012). The Parking Authority also relied on this case law to 
support the same contention before the district court.  
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City counterpart to the Philadelphia Parking Authority—the Taxi and Limousine 
Commission—was not liable under Part A of Title II of the ADA.21 
 But the Parking Authority’s argument misses the point. Although the Second 
Circuit’s decision may well have been persuasive if we had to reach the merits of the 
plaintiffs’ ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, this out-of-circuit case law neither 
prohibits the plaintiffs from commencing their own suit under the ADA nor forecloses an 
award of attorneys’ fees. Indeed, the Parking Authority’s argument ignores both the plain 
language of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act’s fee shifting provisions as well as relevant 
Supreme Court precedent. First, the statutory language of both laws explains that their fee 
shifting provisions apply so long as the action was “commenced pursuant to” or “brought 
to enforce or charge a violation” of the ADA or Rehabilitation Act, respectively.22  
 Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that plaintiffs need not 
prevail on the merits of their claims under the fee shifting statute to recover attorneys’ 
fees.23 “Nothing . . . conditions the District Court’s power to award fees on full litigation 
of the issues or on a judicial determination that the plaintiff’s rights have been 
violated.”24  
 This Court has recognized that a plaintiff may obtain attorneys’ fees even when a 
defendant provides the plaintiff relief the defendant is not legally obligated to offer. In 
                                              
21 Id. at 74. 
22 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (ADA); 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b) (Rehabilitation Act). 
23 See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 
U.S. 598, 604 (2001); Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980). 
24 Maher, 448 U.S. at 129.  
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Disabled in Action of Pennsylvania v. Pierce,25 for instance, Disabled in Action sued the 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development to prevent the agency from moving 
its office space into a handicap inaccessible building. The two parties eventually entered 
into a settlement under which the government agreed to provide handicapped access at 
the building’s main entrance. Disabled in Action then moved for attorneys’ fees. In 
response, the government argued that no fee should be awarded because the settlement 
agreement provided Disabled in Action with relief the organization was not “legally 
entitled to obtain,”26 and therefore this relief was “gratuitous.”27 We rejected that 
argument: “[T]he lawsuit caused the government to provide access for the handicapped at 
the building’s main entrance and to make other services and facilities accessible to the 
handicapped.”28 
 If we accepted the Parking Authority’s argument that the plaintiffs cannot recover 
attorneys’ fees until they prove the defendant’s liability under the statute giving rise to 
fee shifting, we would promote exactly the type of litigation the Supreme Court has 
directed courts to avoid. The Supreme Court has stated “[a] request for attorney’s fees 
should not result in a second major litigation.”29 Accordingly, the Court has instructed 
courts to avoid interpretations of the fee shifting statutes that would “spawn a second 
                                              
25 789 F.2d 1016 (3d Cir. 1986).  
26 Id. at 1020. 
27 Id.  
28 Id.  
29 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983); see Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, 
Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 609 (2001) (quoting 
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437). 
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litigation of significant dimension.”30 The Parking Authority’s contention that it should 
not have to pay attorneys’ fees until it is found liable under the ADA and Rehabilitation 
Act invites a second major litigation that the Supreme Court warned against. 
Accordingly, the Authority’s arguments run contrary to Supreme Court precedent. We 
affirm the district court’s holding that the plaintiffs need not prove the defendants’ 
liability under the fee shifting statutes to recover attorneys’ fees.  
 Finally, leaving aside the language of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act as well as 
the relevant Supreme Court precedent, we note that the Second Circuit’s ruling in Noel 
does not preclude our Court from reaching a different conclusion on the merits of the 
plaintiffs’ statutory claims. Had the district court reached the substance of the plaintiffs’ 
ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, we would have addressed whether the Parking 
Authority is liable under these statutes as a matter of first impression and possibly 
reached a conclusion that was contrary to Noel. Indeed, The Philadelphia Parking 
Authority may well be different from that of New York in ways important to the 
plaintiffs’ suit. Therefore, the Second Circuit’s ruling in Noel does not “exempt” the 
Parking Authority from liability under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act in this circuit or 
others. This analysis, however, is irrelevant to the question of attorneys’ fees since a 
plaintiff does not need to prove the defendant’s liability to recover such fees.  
C.  
                                              
30 Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791 (1989)); see 
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 609 (quoting Garland, 489 U.S. at 791). 
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 In a final attempt to avoid paying attorneys’ fees, the Parking Authority argues 
that even if the plaintiffs have prevailed, special circumstances counsel against an award 
of fees. Under a fee shifting statute like the ADA, a “prevailing party” should ordinarily 
recover its attorneys’ fees and costs absent “special circumstances.”31 Yet, a finding of 
such special circumstances is very rare, and the Supreme Court has offered little guidance 
as to what situations qualify.32 The Supreme Court has indicated that special 
circumstances apply when “it is clear that the reasonable fee is no fee at all.”33 For 
example, in Farrar v. Hobby,34 the Supreme Court found that where a plaintiff only 
recovered one dollar in nominal damages, special circumstances counseled against an 
award of fees.  
 The District Court was well within its discretion to conclude that no such 
circumstances exist here. The Parking Authority also urges this court to take equitable 
considerations into account, crediting its efforts to lobby the Pennsylvanian legislature for 
wheelchair accessible taxicabs. To support this proposition, the Parking Authority cites a 
long string of district court opinions. However, as the Parking Authority itself concedes, 
                                              
31 Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam); Morris v. 
Nationalist Movement, 273 F.3d 527, 535 (3d Cir. 2001).  
32 See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 118 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“We have 
explained that even the prevailing plaintiff may be denied fees if ‘special circumstances 
would render [the] award unjust.’” (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 
(1983))).  
33 Id. at 118 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“After all, where the only reasonable fee is no 
fee, an award of fees would be unjust; conversely, where a fee award would be unjust, the 
reasonable fee is no fee at all.”). 
34 506 U.S. 103 (1992).  
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all of these district court opinions involve the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA),35 
which directs courts to apply traditional equitable principles when ruling on motions for 
attorneys’ fees.36 None of these decisions interpret the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. 
 The Parking Authority’s reliance on EAJA case law is misguided: the EAJA only 
applies to claims against the United States.37 In fact, we have explicitly rejected the 
application of EAJA standards to claims for attorneys’ fees under the ADA and 
Rehabilitation Act. In Disabled in Action v. Pierce,38 the defendant attempted to borrow 
an EAJA rule to argue that the plaintiff was not entitled to fees in a Rehabilitation Act 
suit.  We responded as follows: “[w]e decline the government’s invitation to rewrite 
section 505(b) [of the Rehabilitation Act] by inserting in it the Equal Access to Justice 
Act standard. Thus we find the government’s reliance on . . . an Equal Access to Justice 
Act case[] to be misplaced.”39 We again decline the Parking Authority’s invitation to 
import an EAJA standard into the ADA and Rehabilitation Act and instead affirm the 
district court’s holding that no special circumstances exist here. 
 
III.  
                                              
35 28 U.S.C. § 2412 et seq.  
36 See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d); Burt v. Asche, No. 08-1427, 2011 WL 1325607, at *4 (E.D. 
Pa. Apr. 7, 2011) (quoting United States v. 27.09 Acres of Land, 43 F.3d 769, 772 (2d 
Cir. 1994) (quoting Oguachuba v. I.N.S., 706 F.2d 93, 98 (2d Cir.1983))). 
37 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b). 
38 789 F.2d 1016, 1020 (3d Cir. 1986). 
39 Id. 
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 In sum, we find that the plaintiffs have prevailed, they need not prove the Parking 
Authority’s liability under the fee shifting statutes, and no special circumstances counsel 
against an award of fees in this case. We will therefore affirm the district court’s opinion 
in its entirety. 
